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REAL OR PERSONAL?:  THE AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST 
COVENANT IN THE WILLISTON BASIN AFTER  
GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY 
ANDREW SCOTT GRAHAM 
ABSTRACT 
 
The recent resurgence of oil and gas development in the Williston 
Basin has predictably been accompanied by a dramatic resurgence in oil 
and gas leasing and assignment.  Contemporary developers of existing 
leaseholds often inadvertently inherit leases or agreements with divergent 
priorities, as well as obligations that are simply incongruous with current 
needs.  With this resurgence has come a unique challenge to title 
examination in appropriately defining the scope of inquiry where a 
predecessor in title imposes affirmative obligations that have an uncertain 
legal status with respect to mineral title.  The legal uncertainty of certain 
transactional tools is often tolerated where these tools are necessary to 
permit collaboration and the meaningful structuring of risk, capital, and 
resources in oil and gas plays.  All the same, title examiners continually 
look for clarification to assist their clients in appropriately evaluating and 
limiting risks associated with transactions collateral to title.  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court’s recent decision in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy 
Company assesses the legal status of the area of mutual interest agreements, 
which is a transaction tool designed to increase the potential of mineral 
development.  This Article will identify a tension at the heart of the Court’s 
analysis in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy Company as it concerns its treatment 
of the AMI, and consider the implications of this tension on the future 
treatment of AMIs as convents in North Dakota.  From this analysis, the 
paper asserts that assignees of mineral or leasehold title cannot foreclose the 
possibility that an AMI can exist as a real covenant in North Dakota. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 241 
II. A.G. GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY .............................. 243 
 
  Andrew Scott Graham is an associate attorney at the Canonsburg, Pennsylvania office of 
Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC.  He focuses his practice in the area of energy law and advises oil and 
gas clients on a variety of issues, including oil and gas title, leasing and surface use.  The author 
would like to thank Glen A. Thompson at Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC for his helpful comments on 
this article. 
           
2013] REAL OR PERSONAL? 241 
III. WAS THE AMI IN GOLDEN REALLY A REAL 
COVENANT?—A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT. ....................... 246 
IV. REAL COVENANTS IN NORTH DAKOTA ........................... 249 
A. THE BIGELOW TEST AND CHARACTERIZING THE BENEFIT . 251 
B. FINAL THOUGHTS ON REAL COVENANT ANALYSIS ............ 253 
V. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE AMI AGREEMENT255 
A. CHARACTERIZING THE AMI AGREEMENT ........................... 257 
B. THE AMI IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ..................................... 259 
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 263 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Oil and gas development in the Williston Basin began with a non-
commercial well drilled in southeast North Dakota in 1892.1  Sustained 
commercial drilling in the basin did not begin, however, until the 1950s.2  
Since then, drilling has progressed through three successive cycles of 
sustained oil and gas activity, the first cycle beginning in 1951, the second 
in 1973 and the third in 1994.3  Most recently, in North Dakota, as in other 
parts of the country, technological advancements in horizontal drilling and 
recovery techniques have enabled a surge of oil and gas development.  
Discoveries in the Parshall Oil Field in 2005 have set in motion North 
Dakota’s fourth cycle of sustained development, which continues today.4 
As development techniques have evolved, so too have issues relating to 
property interests and leasing.  Naturally, the incidence and complexity of 
leasehold chains of title have increased after many cycles of sustained 
development and leasing activity.  Leasehold estates that survived the 
 
1. United States Geological Survey Williston Basin Province Assessment Team, Executive 
Summary—Assessment of Undiscovered Oil & Gas Resources of the Williston Basin Province of 
North Dakota, Montana and South Dakota, at 4, available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-
069/dds-069-w/. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 17. 
4. Anthony Effinger, Dakota Oil Fields of Saudi-Sized Reserves Make Farmers Drillers, 
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=ayj1uo_gdNI4.  For example, the number of producing oil wells in the Bakken 
formation has increased from a then historical high of 303 wells in 2007, to over 6,600 wells in 
2013.  N.D. Industrial Comm’n, Dep’t of Mineral Res., Oil and Gas Division, General Statistics, 
https://www.dmr nd.gov/oilgas/stats/statisticsvw.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).  The U.S. 
Geological Survey estimates the presence of 3,844 million barrels of oil, 3,705 billion cubic feet 
of gas and 202 million barrels of total natural gas liquids in the Williston Basin Province—with 
the bulk of this undiscovered oil and gas residing within the Bakken formation.  Id. 
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production cycles of the mid-to-late twentieth century often survived with 
priorities and concerns that contrast starkly with those of contemporary 
development.  This is due to, for example, changes in regulatory schemes, 
increased acreage requirements for pooling obligations, need for greater 
capital investment, and the increased sophistication and cost of recovery 
techniques.  These changes also increase cost barriers to developers 
entering new plays and heighten the need for transactional tools that permit 
collaboration and meaningful structuring of risk, capital, and resources.  
Contemporary developers of existing leaseholds often inadvertently inherit 
leases or agreements with divergent priorities, as well as obligations that are 
simply incongruous with current needs and priorities.  As a result, today’s 
title examiners have the difficult but critical task of defining the scope of 
inquiry where a predecessor in title imposes affirmative obligations that 
may affect the nature of interest assumed by the client. 
These challenges are nowhere better highlighted than in the recent 
North Dakota Supreme Court decision in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy 
Company,5 decided in February of 2013.  The Golden Court assesses the 
relevancy of a forty year old Area of Mutual Interest Agreement (“AMI”) in 
the context of a dispute over the intent of lease operators in a fifteen year 
old assignment.6  In general, the AMI is a contract to offer an option in 
future acquired leasehold or mineral interests within a particular geographic 
area.7  It functions (either as a provisional part of a larger agreement or 
independently) to increase the probability of mineral and leasehold 
development—in part because of its profound impact on title.  Part of the 
efficacy of the AMI depends on its binding effect on successors-in-interest, 
whether that effect is achieved intentionally or through a party’s inadvertent 
assumption of the burden.8  The AMI’s effect on title occupies an uncertain 
legal status in many oil and gas producing states.  Where courts have 
encountered the AMI, they have reached significantly divergent conclusions 
as to its appropriate classification as a covenant, and its impact on title.9  
The recent decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in Golden is 
typical of this uncertainty.  It raises a number of questions to the character 
of the AMI and its relationship to title and the effected estates. 
 
5. 2013 ND 17, 826 N.W.2d 610.  
6. Id. ¶ 1, 826 N.W.2d at 613. 
7. John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 844 (1987). 
8. See generally Justin J. Quigley & Stephen Hull, Give What? To Whom? But Why? Area of 
Interest Provisions in Mining Agreements, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 38-1 (2009); see also 
Terry I. Cross, The Ties That Bind:  Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation That 
Commonly Burden Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 193 (1999). 
9. See generally Quigley & Hull, supra note 8. 
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The proceeding discussion will first highlight a tension at the core of 
the Court’s reasoning in Golden—between the Court’s implied 
characterization of the AMI and the relationship of the AMI to the vested 
leasehold.  This tension exposes the need for a more consistent 
jurisprudence concerning the relationship of the AMI to demised estates.  
Comparing the law of real covenants in North Dakota to the purpose and 
function of the AMI, this Article asserts the following two theses:  First, the 
AMI ought to be characterized as a benefit to certain demised estates for 
purposes of the real covenant analysis because of its intended and important 
role in facilitating the development of estates bound by its obligations.  
Second, following Golden, assignees of mineral or leasehold title cannot 
foreclose the possibility that an AMI can exist as a real covenant in North 
Dakota. 
II. A.G. GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY 
A. G. Golden and several other plaintiffs (collectively, “Golden”)10 
owned a number of oil and gas leases covering property in McKenzie 
County, North Dakota.  In July of 1970, Golden assigned these leases 
(“Original Leasehold”) to Universal Resources Corporation (“Universal”).  
In conjunction with the assignment of leases between Golden and 
Universal, the parties executed an accompanying letter of agreement 
(“Letter Agreement”) providing for a “joint area of interest” (i.e., the AMI).  
The AMI obligated Golden to offer Universal any future leaseholds he 
purchased within a defined geographic area in return for a four percent 
overriding royalty interest and reciprocally obligated Universal to assign to 
Golden a four percent overriding royalty interest in any leaseholds 
Universal acquired within the same defined geographic area.11  The Letter 
 
10. A. G. Golden was joined in the action by several other plaintiffs including:  Paul E. 
Nordstog, Cooper B. Land, Solveig K. Land, Howard D. Armentrout and Delores K. Armentrout, 
as Co-Trustees of the Armentrout Family Revocable Living Trust dated May 24, 2005, Craig L. 
Bolenbaugh, and Joseph Michael Bolenbaugh, Peter Francis Bolenbaugh and James Patrick 
Bolenbaugh, as joint tenants, and Royalty Interests Partnership, LP. 
11. Golden, ¶ 2, 826 N.W.2d at 613-14.  The AMI provided in relevant part:   
A joint area of interest is designated between the parties hereto and is described as All 
of Sections 19, 20, 29, 30, 31 and 32 in Township 153 North, Range 95 West and all 
of Section 2 in Township 152 North, Range 96 West.  It is agreed that should A.G. 
Golden purchase any leasehold interest within the above descirbed [sic] area, he will 
offer it at cost to Universal Resources Corporation, subject to a reservation of four per 
cent (4%) overriding royalty.  Should Universal Resources Corporation purchase any 
leasehold interest in the joint area of interest, they will assign a four percent (4%) 
overriding royalty to A. G. Golden without cost.  Said joint area of interest is shown 
by Exhibit “B” (attached hereto and made a part hereof) . . . . Should production be 
encountered on any acreage owned or controlled by Universal Resources Corporation 
in the joint area of interest, the obligations of the parties hereto shall continue to each 
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Agreement also provided that “[a]ny assignment of this agreement made by 
[Universal] shall recite the terms and conditions of this agreement.”12  In 
effect, the Letter Agreement obligated Universal to assign the AMI to any 
successors-in-title.  The Letter Agreement was recorded by the parties. 
Universal purchased several leases during the 1980s within the 
geographic area covered by the AMI, including the “Thompson Lease,” and 
duly assigned to Golden a four percent overriding royalty interest in those 
leases.13  In 1993, Universal assigned its interest in the Original Leases and 
Thompson leases (lands covered by the AMI) to Tipperary Petroleum 
Company (“Tipperary”).14  This assignment, known as the “Universal-
Tipperary assignment” provided that Universal had assigned: all right, title 
and interest of [Universal] in and to . . . all operating agreements, joint 
venture agreements, partnership agreements, and other contracts, to the 
extent that they relate to any of the Assets.15 
Later in 1993, Tipperary acquired an additional leasehold interest from 
Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. in federal lands (“Federal Lease”) 
also located within the geographic area of the AMI.16  Tipperary did not 
assign any interest from the Federal Lease to Golden.  In a third assignment 
effective March 1, 2000, Tipperary assigned all of its interest in the 
leases—including the Original Leases, Thompson and Federal Leases—and 
its contractual rights and obligations to Nance Petroleum Corporation 
(“Nance”).17  The assignment and bill of sale specified that Nance “assumes 
all of Assignor’s duties, liabilities and obligations relating to the Assets to 
which Assignor was a party or by which it was bound on and after the date 
hereof.”18  Nance later merged into SM Energy Company (“SM Energy”).19 
SM Energy operated a well situated within the drill spacing unit for the 
Thompson and Federal Leases and paid Golden the royalties due under 
production attributable to the Thompson lease, but not those attributable to 
the Federal Lease that was originally acquired by Tipperary.20  Golden sued 
 
other for so long as production continues . . . . The terms of this paragraph shall extend 
to all new lease purchases, lease renewals lease extensions of any nature whatsoever. 
Golden, ¶ 2, 826 N.W. 2d 610 at 613-14. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.  An overriding royalty interest is an interest in production “carved out” of the working 
interest in the lease.  PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND 
GAS LAW ABRIDGED, § 418 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MYERS]. 




18. Id.  
19. Id. 
20. Id. ¶ 4. 
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SM Energy in an action for declaratory judgment, to quiet title, and for an 
accounting to recover royalties under the Federal Lease.21  The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Golden, holding that SM Energy, 
through its predecessor-in-interest, had assumed the obligations under the 
AMI of the Letter Agreement.  The trial court reasoned that the language of 
the Universal-Tipperary assignment, Tipperary’s constructive notice of the 
recorded Letter Agreement, and Tipperary’s acceptance of the benefit of the 
assignment in light of North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-2522 
demonstrated Tipperary’s intent to assume the obligation imposed by the 
AMI included in the Letter Agreement.  The trial court held that Tipperary, 
and by extension SM Energy, assumed the obligation imposed by the AMI 
as a matter of law.  SM Energy subsequently appealed the order of the trial 
court granting summary judgment.23 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the parties stipulate that 
the AMI was a personal covenant, not a real covenant, and was subject to 
the law of assignment.24  Pursuant to the law of assignment, the question of 
whether SM Energy was obligated under the AMI turns upon whether the 
parties had each assumed the obligation from their respective predecessor-
in-title.25  Because SM Energy had assumed all of Tipperary’s obligations, 
the Court focused on the language of the Universal and Tipperary 
assignment.  Contrary to the trial court, the Court found the language of the 
assignment to be ambiguous on whether Tipperary assumed the obligation 
of the AMI under the Letter Agreement.  Specifically, the Court observed 
the language of the assignment could be rationally interpreted to either 
include or exclude the AMI depending on how one treats the phrase “to the 
extent.”26  The AMI provided, in relevant part, that Tipperary would 
assume all “contracts . . . to the extent that they relate to any of the 
Assets.”27  In light of this apparent ambiguity, the Court determined that 
resolving the question of Tipperary’s intent to assume the AMI obligations 
 
21. Id.  Golden also sought accounting for payments on a production on a well located on the 
subject property pursuant to an executed division order.  See generally id. ¶¶ 23-26, 826 N.W.2d 
at 619. 
22. Id. ¶ 15, 826 N.W.2d at 617-18.  N.D. CENT. CODE. § 9-03-25 provides:  “A voluntary 
acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising 
from it so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person accepting.” 
23. Golden, ¶ 6, 826 N.W.2d at 615. 
24. Id. ¶ 9. 
25. Id. ¶10. 
26. Id. ¶ 13, 865 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Nichols v. Goughnor, 2012 ND 178, ¶ 12, 820 
N.W.2d 740, 744 (N.D. 2002) (observing that “[a] contract is ambiguous when rational arguments 
can be made for different interpretations.”)). 
27. Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d  at 614. 
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under the Letter Agreement was a question of fact and reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment. 
The law of assignment provides that a party may assume an obligation 
explicitly or by implication.28  If an obligation was not explicitly assumed, 
implicit assumption of the obligation “may be manifested by the parties’ 
conduct, the subject matter of the contract, the language of the assignment, 
or the surrounding circumstances.”29  The Court concluded that nothing of 
record provided any indication of Tipperary’s intent regarding the 
assumption of the AMI.30  Responding to the reasoning of the trial court, 
the Supreme Court observed that constructive notice of the obligation is not 
determinative of intent to assume that obligation.31  Furthermore, the trial 
court’s conclusion that Tipperary had assumed the benefit of the transaction 
and therefore intended to assume the AMI’s obligation was misguided.  The 
Court observed that this conclusion begged the question whether a party 
entered into the transaction in the first place.32  Instead, looking to the 
language of the Universal-Tipperary assignment, the question the Court 
remanded was as follows: did Universal and Tipperary intend for the AMI 
to “relate” to the assigned assets?  In summary, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court resolved that SM had assumed Tipperary’s obligations, but the scope 
of the obligations was uncertain.  Golden’s holding turns upon the language 
of and intent of the fifteen year old Universal-Tipperary assignment. 
III. WAS THE AMI IN GOLDEN REALLY A REAL COVENANT?—A 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT. 
A covenant is not a real covenant unless the executing parties intend it 
to be.33  On this basis alone, the Golden Court can dismiss the notion that 
the AMI functioned as a real covenant.34  But this is not where the Court 
ended its analysis.  The Golden Court characterized the AMI as a personal 
covenant, citing Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal LLC,35 for the proposition that 
 
28. Id. ¶ 10, 826 N.W.2d at 615-16 (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 94, 485-86 (2004)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 826 N.W.2d at 616-17. 
31. Id. ¶ 14, 826 N.W.2d at 617. 
32. Id. ¶ 16, 826 N.W.2d at 618 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-25 (providing that “[a] 
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations 
arising from it so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person accepting.”)). 
33. In Golden, the Court acknowledges that absent intent, a covenant cannot run with the 
land.  Golden, ¶ 9, 865 N.W.2d at 615 (citing Mountain W. Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron 
Co. 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Wyo. 2005), aff’d in part, 470 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that an AMI does not run with the land because the parties did not intend the AMI to run with the 
land)). 
34. Id. 
35. 2009 ND 153, ¶¶ 13-14, 771 N.W.2d 282, 287. 
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the AMI benefited the grantor personally and that the covenant served no 
direct benefit to the land.36  This gratis dictum characterization of the AMI 
begs the question—had the parties intended to execute a real covenant, does 
it follow that the AMI did not benefited the land? 
The facts of Beeter focus on a deed covenant requiring the grantee and 
its successors-in-title to make perpetual payments to the grantor from the 
gross revenues of a waste disposal business conducted on the demised 
property.37  The grantors in the original conveyance sued after a successor-
in-title failed to remit payment pursuant to the covenant.38  To evaluate the 
covenant, the Court applied section 47-04-26 of the North Dakota Code, 
which provides that, “[a]ll covenants contained in a grant of an estate in real 
property, which are made for the direct benefit of the property or some part 
of it then in existence, run with the land.”39  The Court determined that the 
benefit of the covenant (i.e., passive receipt of landfill profits) did not 
“benefit” the land, but served only to personally benefit the grantor.  
Alluding to Henry Bigelow’s real covenant analysis, the Beeter Court cites 
Barton v. Fred Netterville, out of the Southern District of Mississippi, 
observing that a covenant that is not “so related to the land as to enhance its 
value and confer a benefit upon it does not run with the land . . . is a 
collateral and personal obligation.”40  As a result, without a demonstrable 
and direct benefit to the land, the covenant cannot bind successors-in-title 
despite the intent of the original parties.41 
The invocation of Beeter led to the conclusion that the AMI in Golden 
did not provide a “direct benefit” to the leasehold assets, but instead 
constituted only a personal benefit to Golden, the party seeking its 
enforcement.  Notably, the covenant at issue in Beeter can be reduced in 
principal to an exchange of real property for a perpetual payment in 
business profits.  The Golden Court implicitly analogized the passive 
receipt of future landfill profits in Beeter and the receipt of future 
overriding profits from the oil and gas production from yet unacquired 
properties.  Pursuing this logic to its full extent, the benefit enjoyed by 
Golden, according to the court, cannot be said to have “related” to the value 
or use of the real estate interest he retained in the dominant estate—rather, it 
cannot be said that the parties intended the AMI to relate to the assigned 
 
36. Golden, ¶ 9, 865 N.W.2d 610 at 615. 
37. Beeter, ¶ 2, 771 N.W.2d at 283-84. 
38. Id. 
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1999). 
40. Beeter, ¶¶ 13-14, 771 N.W.2d at 286 (citing Barton v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., 317 
F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (S.D. Miss. 2004)). 
41. Id. 
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assets.  In Beeter, the grantor clearly held an easement in gross, with no 
adjoining right in the real estate; in contrast, the assignor in Golden retained 
an interest in the property in the form of an overriding royalty interest.42  
While it is clear that the AMI provision personally benefited Golden, as the 
Court suggested, it does not follow that the AMI is unbeneficial to the 
estate in land.  The presence of a personal benefit is not mutually exclusive 
of the possibility that the AMI was “so related to the land as to enhance its 
value and confer a benefit upon it.”43 
This implicit characterization provided by Beeter is at odds with the 
Court’s determination that the language of the Universal-Tipperary 
assignment is ambiguous.  That is, the observation that the AMI may or 
may not relate to the transferred assets reflects an implicit indecision about 
the nature of the AMI provision at issue in the case.  On one hand, the court 
implied that the AMI cannot relate to either of the leasehold estates for the 
purpose of benefiting them.  On the other hand, the Court said it was 
possible that the AMI was related to the leasehold estate for purposes of 
delegation.  This indecision is best highlighted in the two interpretations of 
the assignment offered by the litigants, SM Energy and Golden, and the 
underlying competing notions of how, and if, the AMI “relates” to the 
Original Lease and Federal leasehold. 
Pursuant to the Universal-Tipperary assignment, Tipperary assumed 
“contracts to the extent that they relate to any of the Assets.”44  Of course, 
the Court was not clear as to which of the assets (i.e., the Original Lease or 
Federal leasehold) the AMI must “relate” to before the obligation is 
assumed.  Golden’s reading of the assignment implies that an AMI “relates” 
to existing assets, including the Original Lease and Federal leaseholds, 
whereas SM Energy’s reading of the assignment provides that an AMI 
covenant can only “relate” to future acquired assets—that is, only those 
assets Universal would acquire in the future.45  This tension highlights the 
fact that the ambiguity perceived by the court was really a latent ambiguity 
in the characterization of the AMI.  If the AMI cannot “benefit” the land for 
purposes of being characterized as a real covenant, but only confers a 
personal benefit as implied in the Beeter reference, how can it be said to 
“relate” to a present vested real estate interest?  A closer look at what it 
 
42. See, e.g., Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954); GeoStar 
Corp. v. Parkway Petroleum, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 61, 67 (N.D. 1993) (holding that the overriding 
royalty interest is estate in realty). 
43. See generally Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Investors Co., 691 P.2d 970 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
44. Golden, ¶ 3, 826 N.W.2d at 614. 
45. Id. ¶12, 826 N.W.2d at 617. 
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means to “benefit” an estate for purposes of defining a real covenant seems 
to suggest that Golden’s reading of the assignment—that the AMI related to 
the Original and Federal leaseholds—is not a plausible interpretation of the 
Universal-Tiperrary assignment. 
IV. REAL COVENANTS IN NORTH DAKOTA 
The analysis of real covenants under the common law presents a 
similar question as that posed by the Universal-Tipperary assignment—is 
the covenant so related to the land to confer a benefit or enhance its value?  
North Dakota’s law concerning real covenants is codified at North Dakota 
Century Cody section 47-04-24 et seq.  The benefit requirement treated in 
Beeter is derived from North Dakota Century Code section 47-04-26, which 
provides that “[a]ll covenants contained in a grant of an estate in real 
property, which are made for the direct benefit of the property or some part 
of it then in existence, run with the land.”46  The section of the code 
immediately following provides: 
A covenant for the addition of some new thing to real property, or 
for the direct benefit of some part of the property not then in 
existence or annexed thereto, when contained in a grant of an 
estate in such property and made by the covenantor expressly for 
the covenantor’s assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs 
with the land so far only as the assigns thus mentioned are 
concerned.47 
These provisions of the North Dakota Century Code are the product of 
an early attempt to bring order to the notoriously arcane law of real 
covenants.  Derived from the “Field Code,” these provisions are a 
codification of substantive New York law undertaken by David Dudley 
Field and enacted in the Dakota Territory in 1866.  The above-quoted 
sections 47-04-26 and 27 specifically codified the rule in Spencer’s Case.48  
 
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1999). 
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-27 (1999). 
48. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B. 1583).  North Dakota has no case law 
addressing the meaning or effect of Section 47-04-27 on the running of covenants.  Section 27 
shares the same origin of identical provisions in Montana, South Dakota and California.  All were 
copied from New York’s “Field Code” (published in 1865) and adopted by the Dakotas in 1866.  
Montana and South Dakota—like North Dakota—have no authoritative case law addressing the 
meaning or effect of section 47-04-27 on the running of covenants.  An unpublished Montana 
decision does cite the provision to uphold a covenant subjecting successor purchasers to the rules 
of a homeowners association not yet in existence).  See Lewis v. Ponderosa Pines Ranch Prop. 
Owners Ass’n, 126 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2005) (unpublished).  California, on the other hand, has 
extensive commentary on the code corollary of section 47-04-27—namely California Code section 
1464, repealed 1997.  California adopted the Field Code in 1872 along with sections 1462 and 
1464 (repealed 1997)—the corollaries of N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-04-26 and 27, respectively.  
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Although David Field compiled the code with a Benthamian vision of 
displacing the common law, the adopting states, including North Dakota, 
almost immediately began supplementing their application of Code 
provisions with common law principles.49  For example, the itemized 
covenants of section 47-04-26 of the Code were early treated as a general 
guiding principal rather than an exclusive list for construing covenants that 
run with the land.50 
At common law, a real covenant is a “covenant so connected with 
realty that either the right to enforce or the duty to perform passes to assigns 
of the land.”51  For a covenant to run with the land, a party seeking 
enforcement needed to establish four elements:  (1) horizontal; (2) vertical 
privity; (3) intent that the covenant run; and (4) the covenant must “touch 
and concern” the land.52  The difficulty of interpreting real covenants arises 
most often in the context of the fourth element—whether the covenant can 
be said to “touch and concern” an estate in land.53  Showing that Spencer is 
alive and well, Beeter’s benefit principal derives from the common law 
requirement that the covenant ‘touch and concern’ an estate in land.54 
The “touch and concern” element of the real covenant analysis has its 
origins in a 1583 English decision known as Spencer’s Case.55  The facts of 
Spencer’s Case involve a covenant between a lessor and lessee, providing 
that the lessee erect a brick wall upon the leased premises.  Spencer taught 
that for a covenant to run, it must explicitly bind assignees and it must 
“touch and concern” the land.  At its best, the legacy of the “touch and 
concern” doctrine has been one of confusion.  The most well-known 
 
Commentaries on these sections identify Section 1464 squarely as a derivative of the rule in 
Spencer’s Case.  See Repeal of Civil Code Section 1464:  The First Rule in Spencer’s Case, 26 
CAL. L. REV. COMM. REPORTS 29, 33 (1996). 
49. See Robert G. Natelson, Running With the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17, 39-
41 (1990). 
50. For a discussion of the creation, adoption and use of the Field Code in the Dakotas, see 
William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code:  More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45 N.D. 
L. REV. 9 (1968); Natelson, supra note 49, at 39-41; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81 
N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (observing that the code does not provide an exclusive list of possible 
real covenants provided in the common law, but only examples of those covenants); Reeves & Co. 
v. Russell, 148 N.W. 654-9 (N.D. 1914) (observing that the common law was adopted by code 
revisions in 1905 to provide rights and remedies not identified in statute). 
51. Charles E. Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants, 
32 YALE L.J. 123, 123 (1922). 
52. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 74. 
53. Cf. Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that an 
AMI did not run because privity was lacking between the parties where the original leasehold had 
expired).  The Court opined that after the leasehold had terminated, the AMI could only be 
enforced as a personal covenant.  See id. at 727.  
54. Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal LLC, 2009 ND 153, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d, 282, 286. 
55. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 74. 
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attempt to provide a workable order to the case law is the analysis provided 
by Professor Henry Bigelow.56  Bigelow distilled the case law following 
Spencer’s Case to identify two categories of real covenants:  (1) those 
imposing limitations upon the rights that form a part of the title to land; and 
(2) those whose connection with the land is in the character of the benefit 
conferred.57  It is the second category—those that pivot upon character of 
the benefit—that is particularly significant to a discussion of the AMI. 
A. THE BIGELOW TEST AND CHARACTERIZING THE BENEFIT 
Essentially, Bigelow’s test of whether the covenant runs with the land 
rests on whether it materially affects the promisor’s legal relationship to the 
land.58  An effect is material if the covenant renders an interest of the estate 
holder more or less valuable.  Although the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has never explicitly acknowledged Bigelow’s analysis as the source of its 
real covenants understanding, it has nevertheless implicitly adopted the test.  
Opining on section 47-04-26, the Beeter Court articulated that standard, 
observing that a covenant which is not “so related to the land as to enhance 
its value and confer a benefit upon it does not run with the land . . . is a 
collateral and personal obligation.”59  According to Bigelow, the benefit or 
value must arise out of the legal relations of the parties as owner of interests 
in the estate and not merely their generic interests as citizens.60  Otherwise, 
“where the covenant is of such a nature that the performance of it might 
equally well be made to enure to the benefit of any given person” the 
covenant must be personal.61  Bigelow’s analysis determing the nature of 
the covenant’s effect on title essentially involves two questions—the first is 
a question of fact and the second is a question of law:  (1) what privilege or 
power of the covenantee is the covenant primarily designed to and does 
protect; and (2) is the privilege or power in question possessed by 
covenantee by virtue of his estate in land?62  If the covenant does not 
protect a privilege incident to an estate in land, it does not run. 
 
56. Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH L. REV. 639 (1914). 
See 6A RICHARD W. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROP.  673[2][a] (1994);  
see also Michael J. D. Sweeney, The Changing Role of Private Land Restrictions:  Reforming 
Servitude Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 672 (1995) (observing that a majority of courts have 
adopted Bigelow’s test for determining whether a covenant can be said to touch and concern a 
given estate). 
57. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 652. 
58. Id. at 639. 
59. Beeter, ¶10, 771 N.W.2d at 286 (citations omitted); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 
81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (reiterating the common law test of real covenants). 
60. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 645. 
61. Id. at 645-46. 
62. Id. at 646. 
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Bigelow illustrates the distinction between those benefits that relate to 
the land and those that enure to the benefit of any generic person by 
comparing two promises that might be exchanged between a lessor and 
lessee.  First, the lessor may require the lessee to deliver to him all the grain 
grown upon the demised premises; second, the lessee may require the lessor 
to maintain windbreaks upon the demised premises.  According to Bigelow, 
the former of these promises would not run, while the latter would.  The 
difference between the two being that the promise to deliver grain (just as 
the promise to deliver landfill profits in Beeter) benefits only the lessor, not 
as the owner of revisionary interest in the land, but as the owner of a 
chattel; whereas the promise to erect windbreaks “operates directly to make 
more valuable the exercise of the privilege of raising grain.”63 
Of course, a promise that runs with the land will necessarily affect the 
value of that land.  For this reason, the Bigelow test has drawn criticism as 
being circular in its logic.64  Of course, this problem can be avoided if the 
effect of a promise concerning land can be evaluated independently of its 
effect on successive interests in title.  Nevertheless, the circular nature of 
the test is also instructive in understanding a fundamental aspect of real 
covenant laws.  Namely, the covenant must directly operate to benefit the 
land.  Bigelow remarks that a covenant does not run if it only “indirectly or 
mediately operate[s] to the benefit of the covenantee with respect to his 
rights as owner of the soil.”65  Accordingly, the outcome of this analysis 
often depends upon how the reviewing court first characterizes the intended 
benefit of the covenant as conceived by the executing parties.  Many 
covenants—like the AMI—can have many benefits, some direct and some 
collateral, including their direct effect on successive interests in title. 
Thus, given this potential for confusing the direct and collateral 
benefits of covenants, it becomes clear that the crucial determination of the 
Bigelow test is how a given court chooses to characterize the benefit of the 
covenant.  Comparison is useful to illustrate the narrow margin of certain 
scenarios that arise under the Bigelow test in this context.  Bigelow 
provides an example of two divergent treatments of the “privilege” or 
“right” protected by a non-compete agreement.  Two cases, Thomas v. 
Haywood66 and Norman v. Wells67 were decided on identical facts:  a lessor 
covenanted not to sell liquor within a mile of a saloon he leased to his 
 
63. Id. 
64. See Sweeney, supra note 56, at 678; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 
962, 1037 n.56 (1981) (observing that the logic of the Bigelow test is circular). 
65. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 646. 
66. L. R. 4 Ex. 311 (1869). 
67. 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 136 (1837). 
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lessee.68  The court in Thomas held that the covenant was not enforceable 
by the lessee’s successor-in-title, as the benefit enured to the lessee’s 
financial benefit as a vendor.69  The Norman court reached the opposite 
conclusion and construed the benefit of the non-compete covenant as a 
privilege of selling liquor in a particular place rather than a privilege solely 
related to his rights in chattel. 
The significance of the Norman case and the illustration of the 
treatment of non-compete covenants is two-fold.  First, these cases touch 
upon the running of a non-compete covenant, the benefit of which is 
directly analogous to a benefit of the AMI.  Second, Norman is a New York 
case of the Field Code variety.  While North Dakota has ostensibly 
recognized the running of non-compete covenants, the reasoning 
underpinning Norman also arguably introduces to the Field Code states a 
precedent for construing the promised benefit in the context of the unique 
circumstances of the estate.70  That is, the respective holdings of Thomas 
and Norman can be distinguished in how each court considers the privilege 
of selling liquor in context of the estate itself—whereas the Thomas court 
conceptually separates the right to the profit of the land from the business 
conducted on it, the Norman Court considers the business conducted on the 
land as a privilege or right appurtenant to the lessor’s estate in land.71 
B. FINAL THOUGHTS ON REAL COVENANT ANALYSIS 
These observations lead to a final point regarding a much more 
intuitive aspect to real covenants—namely, the fact that a particular 
privilege or benefit contained in a covenant must be evaluated in the context 
of unique privileges and limitations of a given estate.72  This point is 
particularly true of oil and gas leasehold or mineral estates.73  The oil and 
 
68. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 651. 
69. Id.  
70. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (observing that non-compete 
covenants run with the land at common law).  
71. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1943). 
72. See WILLIAMS & MYERS, supra note 13, § 202.1.  The unique status of an oil and gas 
leasehold vis a vis adjoining landowners is observed in Colorado.  See, Maralax Res., Inc. v. 
Chamberlain, No. 12CA2575, 2014 WL 43531 (Colo. App. Jan. 2, 2014).  Here, the court granted 
an oil and gas lessee standing to maintain a prescriptive easement claim against an adjoining 
landowner because of its character as real property.  The court observed “[b]ecause of the unique 
nature and purposes of oil and gas leases, we do not agree that common law landlord-tenant 
principles apply to determine whether an oil and gas lessee has standing to maintain a prescriptive 
easement claim.”  Id. at 11. 
73. The leasehold and constituent rights in royalties are considered real property in North 
Dakota.  Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954); GeoStar Corp. v. 
Parkway Petroleum, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 61, 67 (N.D. 1993) (holding that the overriding royalty 
interest is estate in realty).  Clearly AMIs can be employed in the conveyance of mineral or fee 
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gas leasehold exists to facilitate the exploration and production of mineral 
rights in land for the realization of profit in form of royalties—which can 
also be treated as a separate estate in land.  The leasehold is uniquely 
limited by a term extended only by active operation.  Profit from the 
development is the only benefit to the estate. 
Consider again the facts of Beeter where an agreement is made to 
convey property in exchange for passive profits from a landfill business 
conducted upon the land.  In Golden, the plaintiff retained a right in passive 
profits in the form of a discrete estate in the leasehold, an overriding-royalty 
interest.  This comparison illustrates the uniqueness of the leasehold estate 
and its appurtenant rights—what was a personal covenant in Beeter is an 
estate in land in Golden. 
Yet the facts of Beeter are a poor analogy for understanding the benefit 
of the AMI for another reason.  In the confines of the unique and limited 
uses of an oil and gas leasehold, the AMI operated as a covenant not to 
compete between two parties on adjoining leaseholds, and directly affected 
the prospects of leasehold development on the Original Leasehold estate in 
which both parties had vested interests.  Thus, when asking the question 
under Bigelow’s analysis (i.e., what privilege or power is the AMI covenant 
designed to and does protect?), it becomes clear that the privileges and the 
powers of the oil and gas leasehold must be considered with the 
understanding that oil and gas development, for the realization of profit, is 
the sole end of the oil and gas leasehold. 
While the continued relevance and viability of the common law 
conception of real convent is debated,74 Bigelow’s test remains the law of 
many oil and gas producing states, including North Dakota.  Reviewing 
Bigelow’s analysis of real covenants, we see that the question implied in 
Golden—that is, does the AMI “relate” to the Original or Federal 
Leaseholds?—is the same question that would have been posed in a 
covenant analysis under Bigelow.  The consideration of the privilege or 
power the AMI covenant is designed to protect must be asked in the unique 
context of the rights and privileges of the leasehold estate. 
 
estates.  However, the typical absence of a term in these conveyance creates a unique set of 
problems that I do not evaluate here.  
74. Some states, like California, have overhauled their statues governing covenants over 
concerns about the relevance of, and arcane qualities of, real covenants—particularly with the 
inconsistency of the first rule in Spencer’s Case with modern priorities.  Sweeney, supra note 56, 
at 678. 
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V. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE AMI AGREEMENT 
I’ve highlighted the tension at the heart of Golden’s passing 
characterization of the AMI covenant and its holding concerning the 
language of assignment.75  In light of the law of real covenants in North 
Dakota, it becomes clear that Golden’s characterization of the AMI as a 
covenant without a direct benefit to the land presupposes that it has no 
relationship or (at best) an attenuated relationship to the Original and 
Federal Leaseholds.  This raises the question of how the AMI ought to be 
characterized as they relate to leasehold estates under the rubric of the 
Bigelow Test. 
AMIs appear in many contexts, and as a result, have been characterized 
in a number of different ways by legal commentators.  The Golden Court 
itself relied upon an early assessment by Dante Zarlengo of the AMI 
provision and its nature as a covenant.76  Zarlengo argued that the 
obligations of the AMI should be treated as a form of option contract, 
suggesting that: 
an area of mutual interest clause does not directly affect ownership 
of the particular oil and gas leases to be conveyed.  It does not alter 
in any way the rights of an oil and gas lessee to go upon the land 
and produce oil and gas, pay delay rentals, or [have] the right to 
production from the oil and gas lease.77 
Accordingly, Zarlengo argues that the AMI passes to successors-in-title as 
they take title subject to contracts containing AMI obligations—“[w]hether 
or not these obligations were assumed by a party acquiring oil and gas 
leases subject to an area of mutual interest clauses is a question of intent, 
and all the surrounding circumstances must be evaluated to determine that 
intent.”78  The Golden Court’s analysis builds upon the foundation Zarlengo 
lays, assuming the legal character of the AMI and focusing on intent.79  
The same year that Zarlengo published his article, the Texas Supreme 
Court decided Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., holding 
that an AMI could run with the land.80  In response to the Westland 
decision, Angus Earl McSwain criticized the Court’s notion that the AMI 
 
75. Golden, ¶ 9, 826 N.W.2d at 615. Construing the AMI as a personal covenant because of 
the lack of intent does not create this problem.  It is the Golden Court’s citation of Beeter that 
creates this tension. 
76. Id. ¶ 11, 826 N.W. 2d at 616. 
77. See generally Dante L. Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest Clauses Regarding Oil and 
Gas Properties:  Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 14 (1982). 
78. Id. at 859-60. 
 79.  Golden, ¶ 11, 826 N.W.2d at 616. 
80. Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982). 
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could confer a benefit to the land:  “[a] contract to do something which 
bears no relation to the use or value of the land cannot operate to benefit or 
burden assigns” despite the intentions of the parties.81  The AMI’s purpose 
in Westland, McSwain argues, was “not to affect the use or value of 
[acreage within the AMI] but rather to induce the conveyance thereof.”82  
McSwain likens the AMI in Westland to a purchase money mortgage—a 
contract that “deals with, and is tied to the land or interest conveyed, but its 
basis is found in the terms of the conveyance of the property and not in its 
effect upon the land.”83  Like Zarlengo, McSwain argues that that the type 
of covenant represented by the AMI, like the purchase money mortgage, 
can be binding on an assignee “only when he expressly assumes it and not 
when he merely takes the estate ‘subject to’ the lien.”84 
More recently, Terry Cross has argued for a more focused analysis of 
the AMI contract itself and its context.85  Cross acknowledges a practical 
need for a mechanism to bind successive interest holders in the contexts of 
certain agreements that facilitate leasehold development.86  While Zarlengo 
argues that the AMI is always a de facto personal covenant, Cross 
conversely suggests that the initial focus should be on analyzing the AMI 
covenant itself—identifying the original interest burdened “and remain 
focused on those burdened interests” when considering the benefit of the 
AMI.87  The few court decisions addressing the issue of whether AMIs can 
or should run with the land are split along these same lines: between 
assuming the character of the AMI and employing a willingness to evaluate 
the benefit in context of the intended purposes of the transaction of rights. 
The Zarlengo/McSwain assumption creates two problems.  First, this 
approach leaves the parties to the AMI at the mercy of the commitment of 
the opposite party in assuring its interests are preserved in future 
assignments.  The inefficacy of this approach is highlighted in Golden 
because Golden was left to rely on Universal, now long gone, to clearly 
delegate and assign the AMI’s provisions.  Second, the assumption that the 
AMI (to borrow McSwain’s language describing Westlands’ AMI) “bears 
no relation to the use or value of the land” can force perverse reasoning 
when interpreting relatively common assignment language.  Zarlengo’s 
 
81. Angus E. McSwain, Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil:  New Uncertainties as 
to Scope of Title Search, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 636 (1983).  
82. Id. at 641. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See generally Cross, supra note 8. 
86. Id. at 218. 
87. Id. at 220. 
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problem is the Golden dilemma: if courts are to assume the AMI can have 
no relation to the use of value of the property as an initial premise, it is then 
inconsistent to consider whether or not the parties intended the AMIs to 
relate to and benefit the demised property.  But, as we shall see, courts 
consistently find that AMIs do relate to the demised premises – at least 
insofar as they function to facilitate development and reward risk.  Further, 
under Zarlengo’s analysis, any relationship between the AMI and demised 
property is per se attenuated and incidental, and obligations of an AMI 
could only conceivably be assigned where they are expressly assigned.  
This is a preferable way (at least conceptually) of preventing AMIs from 
acting like a runaway train in title succession, but it also creates a complete 
bar to interest holders from employing an important protection of structured 
arrangements of risk and capital in cooperative development agreements. 
A. CHARACTERIZING THE AMI AGREEMENT 
AMI covenants commonly appear in agreements affecting oil and gas 
assets in regions where little exploration has occurred.88  The nature of an 
AMI is a contract to convey an interest in oil and gas lease interests.89  The 
AMI requires that parties acquiring interest within a defined area:  (1) give 
notice to all parties of any acquisition and its terms within the defined area; 
and (2) provide to all parties of the agreement an option to participate in the 
acquisition for a specified period of time.90  The anticipated interest of an 
AMI typically includes leaseholds or mining rights, but can be broad 
enough to include surface and mineral rights as well.91  Commentators have 
characterized or analogized the AMI to option contracts, preferential-right-
to-purchase agreements, purchase money mortgages, or non-compete 
agreements.92  AMIs may appear independently or as part of joint operating 
agreements, farmout agreements, confidentiality agreements, earn-in 
agreements, or as part of a leasehold assignment.93 
The typical motivation for parties entering into an AMI agreement is to 
provide protection for geological data, reduce risk and cost, spread risk, 
 
88. Zarlengo, supra note 77, at 859-60. 
89. John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 844 (1987).  
90. Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement—Interpretation, 
Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1263, 1346-47 (1988). 
91. Mark T. Nesbitt, Area of Interest Provisions—Two Edged Swords, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. § 21.02[2] (1989). 
92. See Zarlengo supra note 77, at 859-60; Cross, supra note 8, at 215-20; Conine, supra 
note 90, at 1346-47.  But see Hultberg v. City of Garrison, 56 N.W.2d 319, 322 (N.D. 1953) 
(holding that an option to purchase real property is a privilege given by the owner to the optionee, 
and vests in the optionee no interest in the property until he has accepted the option and becomes 
obligated thereby in accordance with its terms). 
93. See Quigley & Hull, supra note 8, at 4.  
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organize investments, and in conjunction with a MUI provision,94 guarantee 
the participation of sufficiently capitalized parties.95  The primary purpose 
of the AMI is to increase the likelihood of leasehold or mineral 
development.  The AMI often represents an equitable division of, and 
participation in, interests acquired on the basis of joint expenditure and 
information.96  In context of joint operating agreements, these provisions 
permit parties to “insure a fair distribution of any benefits derived from the 
joint investment of the parties and the information and data obtained from 
joint operations.”97  The practical effect of the AMI is to limit competition 
within a given geographic area.98  An AMI executed within the context of a 
confidentiality agreement has the effect of creating unilateral obligation.99 
AMIs typically appear in one of four scenarios.100  First, similarly 
situated parties will execute an AMI to limit competition and avoid costs 
related to seismic options or leases and spread the risk of acquisition, 
exploration, and development.  Parties in this scenario will likely be in 
equal bargaining positions.  Second, an independent producer with the 
technical and operational expertise, but limited geological and geophysical 
data, can use an AMI provision to define the areas where passive investors 
will fund future acquisitions.  This will create a “take-it or leave it” 
situation for willing investors.  Third, and similar to the second scenario, an 
AMI may be used in situations where a development company with an 
otherwise strong lease position, data and technical and operational expertise 
is seeking to spread risk of exploration and production.101  This situation 
will likewise create a “take-it or leave it” situation for willing investors.  
 
94. The “maintenance of uniform interest,” or “MUI” provision allows the smooth operation 
of the AMI over time.  Cross, supra note 8, at 220.  The MUI serves to either prevent non-uniform 
assignment of interests subject to an AMI, or otherwise allocate responsibility under the AMI 
when parties to the original agreement assign an unequal undivided interests.  Id. at 222. 
95. Id. at 214-15. 
96. Anita Gefreh Himebaugh, An Overview of Oil and Gas Contracts In the Williston Basin, 
59 N.D. L. REV. 7, 32 (1983). 
97. Conine, supra note 90, at 1337.  Conine observes that in jurisdictions that treat joint 
operating agreements as joint ventures, the need for these sort of assurances are lessened by the 
presence of fiduciary duty.  Id. at 1337-38.  North Dakota does not imply a joint venture when 
joint operating agreements are formed without an implied or express contract to that effect.  But 
see Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Res., Inc., 2012 ND 91, 816 N.W.2d 80 (observing that 
JOA did not create a joint venture and that parties to a JOA were not co-tenants). 
98. Cross, supra note 8, at 215. 
99. Quigley & Hall, supra note 8, § 38.05(2)(a). 
100. See generally Allen D. Cummings, Area of Mutual Interest Agreements, 2010 No. 2 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. Paper No. 10. 
101. Id.  An example of an arrangement under scenarios two and three might include a 
“promoted deal” wherein a promoter finds a drilling prospect and seeks passive investment as to 
the start-up costs.  The initial well is drilled with the investors’ money with advance agreement as 
to the respective rights of the parties to participate in future wells—this agreement constituting the 
“mutual area of interest.”  See Evertson v. Cannon, 411 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Neb. 1987). 
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Finally, an AMI is used in situations where individual players, like landmen 
or petroleum engineers operating as individuals, will seek to leverage their 
respective positions (be it a leasehold interest or geological/geophysical 
information) with larger players such as exploration and production 
companies.102  This situation is similar to that presented in Golden v. SM 
Energy Company.  The individual will seek to strengthen his position by 
seeking an AMI covering a large area with a long term and covering a broad 
range of property interests, as well as bind successors-in-interest. 
B. THE AMI IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
To date, relatively few court cases have addressed the nature of the 
AMI in terms of real covenant jurisprudence.  The handful of cases that 
address the issue provide different answers or inferences to questions raised 
by the analysis.  These cases illustrate both the diversity of circumstance in 
which the AMI can arise, and highlight the value and benefit that the AMI 
confers upon present vested leasehold estates.  A brief review is helpful in 
understanding the AMI in context of its actual use, and is also helpful for 
two reasons.  First, these cases are helpful in understanding how the AMI 
can operate to increase the probability of the leasehold development.  
Second, these cases illustrate the unavoidable relationship between the AMI 
and the vested interest of developers of the leasehold estate. 
In Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil, the Texas Supreme 
Court considered whether an AMI could burden successive interests-in-
title.103  Westland Oil Development (“Westland”) entered into a farmout 
agreement dated, August 4, 1966, with Mobil Oil Corporation (“Mobil”) 
covering Mobil’s multiple leasehold interests.  Westland later assigned its 
interest in the farmout to a partnership, Chambers and Kennedy (“C&K”), 
along with the obligations of an AMI provision executed between Westland 
and Mobile contained in a November 15, 1966, letter agreement.104  C&K 
 
102. See generally Cummings, supra note 100. 
103. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).  Westland is not the first Texas case to deal with the AMI.  
In 1953, an appeals court in Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 
App. 1953), observed that an AMI provision did not violate the rule against perpetuities.  
Although not specifically identifying the provision as an AMI, the court nevertheless observed 
that it did not create right in real property at all but simply gave to predecessors a property right 
contingent on defendant’s purchase of royalties, mineral interests or fee titles in area.  Id. at 393. 
104. The AMI provision read as follows: 
[i]f any of the parties hereto, their representatives or assigns, acquire any additional 
leasehold interests affecting any of the lands covered by said farmout agreement, or 
any additional interest from Mobil Oil Corporation under lands in the area of the 
farmout acreage, such shall be subject to the terms and provisions of this agreement; 
provided, however that in no event shall the owners of the working interest under any 
portion of such acreage be entitled to less than 75% working interest leases. 
Westland, 637 S.W.2d at 905. 
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fulfilled the obligations of the August 4, 1966, farmout between Westland 
and Mobile, and Mobile duly assigned the earned acreage to C&K.  Mobil 
later executed a farmout agreement with Bernard Hanson by letter 
agreement dated April 18, 1972, covering lands within the Westland/Mobile 
farmout, agreeing to assign interest to Hanson in exchange for drilling a test 
well at a specified depth.105  Hanson later entered into a similar farmout 
agreement with C&K covering similar acreage, including acreage derived 
from the agreement with Westland covered by the November 15, 1966, 
letter agreement.106  Hanson then assigned these agreements to Gulf Oil 
Corporation (“Gulf”) and Superior Oil Company (“Superior”).107  When 
Westland learned of the assignment from Mobil pursuant to these farmouts, 
Westland brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the November 
15, 1966, agreement’s provisions were valid and binding on the leasehold 
interests acquired by Gulf and Superior.108 
Addressing the question of whether the AMI could be considered to 
touch and concern the land, the court determined that the AMI did run with 
the land, observing that “the promise to convey the prescribed interests in 
the leases . . . clearly affected the nature and value of the estate 
conveyed . . . .  It burdened the promisor’s estate and could be considered to 
have rendered it less valuable.”109  Although the Westland Court wanders 
into the circular reasoning of the Bigelow analysis, the court’s holding 
implicitly acknowledges a benefit independent of the effect of the AMI on 
successors-in-title.  McSwain sees the AMI as purposed “not to affect the 
use or value” of the initial leasehold, but purposed to “induce” the 
conveyance.110  It is difficult to see how increasing the marketability of the 
leasehold did “not affect the use or value” of the leasehold estate.  The AMI 
initially served to increase the possible return on any risk assumed by 
parties developing the original leasehold, increasing the potential profit of 
the initial venture.  From Mobil’s perspective, the AMI promised an 
increased return of initial investment and greatly increased the likelihood 
that developers would undertake the risk of developing the leasehold.111 
 
105. Id. at 906. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 907. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 911. 
110. McSwain, supra note 81, at 641.  To be consistent with Bigelow’s analysis, it would be 
more appropriate to say that the AMI does not directly affect the use or value of the leasehold.  It 
is clear that it does. 
111. Subsequent court decisions have questioned whether Westland Oil Development had not 
altered Texas’ “touch and concern” analysis by removing “the benefit analysis” from the calculus.  
See In re El Paso Refinery, LP, 302 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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In Kansas, the courts have declared the AMI to be a personal covenant.  
One case, however, offers an example of a dispute over the conveyance of a 
benefited estate.  In Slawson Exploration Co., Inc. v. Vintage Petroleum, 
Inc.,112 the Tenth Circuit applied Kansas’ contract law to the interpretation 
of an assignment of AMI attendant to a leasehold interest in Montana.  
Slawson Exploration (“Slawson”) entered into a participation and operating 
agreement with Oryx Energy Company, formerly Sun Exploration 
Company (“Sun/Oryx”), to produce a leasehold situated in Richland 
County, Montana.113  The participation agreement (i.e., the AMI) provided 
that the parties would explore and jointly develop an area of mutual interest 
with the reciprocal obligation of offering each respective party an option to 
participate in future acquisitions at its proportionate interest.  Slawson 
drilled the Tiller #1-9 Well pursuant to the operating agreement on a 
leasehold within the AMI.114  Slawson later assigned to Vintage Petroleum, 
Inc. (“Vintage”) all its right, title, and interest in several properties, 
including the Tiller #1-9 Well.  The exhibit to the assignment described the 
property interest and provided the qualification that the “assignment is 
expressly limited to the spacing unit for the Tiller #1-9 Well, being the E/2 
NE/4 Section 9, and all of Section 10, T25, R55E, Roosevelt MT.”115  
Following the Slawson/Vintage assignment, Sun/Oryx recompleted the 
Tiller #1-9 Well at a deeper formation, and pursuant to Montana’s 
conservation laws, expanded the Tiller #1-9 spacing unit from 160 to 320 
acres by acquiring additional leaseholds adjacent to the existing well.116  
Sun/Oryx notified Slawson of the acquisition and of its belief that Vintage 
owed the additional acreage under the AMI.  Slawson subsequently brought 
an action seeking declaratory judgment that it, and not Vintage, owed the 
additional interest under the AMI.  The court reviewed the language of the 
assignment conveying unto Vintage “all agreements, leases . . . and other 
instruments in any way related [to the Tiller well and spacing unit]” and 
determined that the AMI agreement “related to” the discrete well interest 
 
112. Slawson Exploration Co., Inc. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 
1996).  The Supreme Court of Kansas characterized the AMI as a personal covenant several years 
before Slawson in context of considering whether the AMI would violate the rule against 
perpetuities.  First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 
126 (Kan. 1984) (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 401 (1944)).  Answering the 
question of whether an AMI without a term would be barred by the rule against perpetuities, the 
court observed that the AMI is purely contractual and does not create right in property:  “[t]he 
contract here did not involve the vesting of future interest in real property and did not constitute a 
restraint upon the alienation of that property.”  Id. 
113. Slawson, 78 F.3d at 1480. 
114. Id. at 1481. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
           
262 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:240 
assigned to Vintage and held that Vintage was the proper recipient of the 
right to participate in additional acreage under the AMI.117 
The Slawson Court evaluated assignment language nearly identical to 
the language of the Universal-Tipperary assignment considered in Golden.  
In both cases, the assignor purported to assign all rights that “relate” to the 
demised premises.  In Slawson, however, the court did not balk at 
determining that Slawson’s original “participation rights” were 
unambiguously “related” to the Tiller Well.118  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court highlighted a distinction Slawson made between the demised 
premises and those adjoining properties “that would be useful in 
developing” a yet undeveloped and adjoining well prospect.119  The 
significance of this distinction is that it subtly implies that the perceived 
relationship between the AMI and the demised property turns upon the 
assignor’s perception of the benefit of the AMI to the usefulness of 
developing the Tiller Well.  The underpinning assumption of Slawson’s 
holding is that the AMI inheres to the development of the leasehold’s estate 
rather than existing as a disembodied contractual benefit. 
The AMI often represents an equitable division of and participation in 
interests acquired on the basis of joint expenditure and information.  The 
equitable operation of the AMI in the second scenario is illustrated in a 
Colorado case—Kincaid v. Western Operating Co.120  In Kincaid, a 
producer and several passive investors executed an operating agreement to 
develop multiple leaseholds in multiple township sections, including a 
section where the parties only possessed fifty percent of a particular 
leasehold interest.121  After success drilling several wells, the operator 
obtained the remaining fifty percent leasehold interest without providing 
notice to the parties who provided the initial investment.122  Although these 
investing parties did not execute an AMI with the original operating 
agreement, the court chose to impose an AMI to effect the implicit intent of 
the parties in the initial agreement and prevent unfair advantage.123 
The Kincaid court imposed the AMI to maintain the equities between 
the parties in a development partnership.  Presumably, the developer in 
Kincaid wsa in the best position to realize the potential of the initial 
 
117. Id. at 1482. 
118. The court considers the effect of the assignment language as it is qualified by 
definitions in the accompanying exhibit.  Id.  The court rejects Slawson’s argument that the 
exhibit demonstrates its intent to assign the well and not the participation rights. 
119. Id. at 1483. 
120. 890 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1994). 
121. Id. at 251. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 253. 
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prospect as well as obtain the remaining interest related to that prospect, 
giving the developer an unfair access to a significant benefit of leasehold 
development—market positioning.  Of course, Kincaid offers no explicit 
commentary on the relationship between the AMI and the leasehold estate 
held by the passive investors.  But implicitly, the court’s holding reflects 
the integral purpose of the AMI to the development of the initial leasehold.  
The scenario presented in Kincaid is also interesting insomuch as it shows 
an AMI operating in a much more intimate proximity to the vested estates 
in land.  It also demonstrates how the AMI operates to divide the unique 
risks and benefits of oil and gas leasehold development.  Here, the AMI 
covenant, conceived and imposed as a necessary enablement to the 
development of a leasehold estate and imposed for realization of the benefit 
of royalty estates, could be characterized as a “benefit” to an estate in land 
entirely independent of its affect of successive title interest—this is 
particularly true in the context of passive investors whose interest in the 
leasehold is solely for the realization of profits through development. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whatever the merits of Golden, the reasoning by the Court was 
misguided.  Promulgating the presumption that the AMI cannot benefit a 
present vested estate for the purpose of real covenant analysis obscures a 
primary motivation behind the use of the AMI.  The AMI operates directly 
to facilitate a leasehold or mineral estate’s development by reducing 
development risk and cost, spreading risk, organizing investments, and 
guaranteeing the participation of sufficiently capitalized parties.  
Furthermore, this presumption leads to confusion in the legal analysis.   
Golden’s characterization of the AMI as a personal covenant is 
implicitly premised upon the assumption that the AMI does not relate to the 
existing leasehold estate, but in the Court’s conclusion, it sends the question 
concerning the relationship of the AMI to the existing leasehold estate back 
to the trial court to consider assignment.  The confusion at the heart of 
Golden over the relationship between the AMI and the present leasehold 
estate highlights the need for a better theory of treating AMI agreements.  A 
better approach for analysis is to inquire into the character of the AMI in the 
context of the circumstances of its creation, asking whether the AMI 
confers a benefit on the leasehold estate or its appurtenant rights 
independent of its effect on successors in title.  
Of course, beyond the question of whether the AMI can be construed to 
bind successors-in-title, is the question as to whether they should bind 
successors-in-title.  AMIs present several competing practical concerns, 
however: first, the concern that mineral developers will inherit leaseholds 
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burdened by no-longer-useful AMIs and second, the concerns that freedom 
of contract and the need for mineral developers to increase incentives for 
spurring development and to enter cooperative agreements with the 
assurance that successive participants will not compete against parties to the 
original agreement with an unfair advantage.  McSwain expresses particular 
concern as to the effect of permitting AMI’s to run with the land on title and 
the resulting burden that will fall upon successive title holders.  Under 
North Dakota’s common law requirement of explicit intent,124 many AMIs 
will pass—if at all—only through delegation and assumption.  Otherwise, 
those AMIs intended to run with the land will declare themselves. 
The issue of characterizing the AMI to understand its effect on title 
represents a collision of a sophisticated aspect of a modern industry with 
one of the more arcane aspects of the common law—the “touch and 
concern” aspect of real covenants.  The AMI shares many analogous 
features to established real covenants such as non-compete covenants or 
option contracts—these similarities manifest both in their operation and in 
their purpose to provide a necessary advantage to realizing the profit from 
the estate.  At common law, both covenants ran with the land.125  The 
application of Bigelow’s two-part analysis126 argues for this same 
conclusion when applying the facts in Golden:  the AMI is principally 
designed to protect Golden’s privilege of realized profit from leasehold 
development, a privilege that inheres to his estate in the overriding royalty 
interest.  Distaste for treating AMIs as real covenants seems to arise in 
circumstances, like that of Golden or Westland, where a real covenant 
extends the claims of passive holders of non-participating royalty interests 
or middlemen on the benefits of active production.  Without a showing that 
such arrangements would discourage productive development, limiting the 
reach of the AMI would disadvantage development by denying parties a 
practical tool for distributing the benefits and risks of market position. 
 
 
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-25. 
125. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899); see also N. Grand Mall 
Assocs., LLC, v. Grand Ctr., Ltd., 278 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2002) (observing that “[a] leasehold 
interest is a recognized estate in land, and the option to purchase was an incident of this interest, a 
covenant running with the land, good against the lessor and any successor in interest of the 
lessor.”). 
126. See discussion supra notes 61-62.  The analysis proposed by Bigelow involves the 
following two questions:  (1) what privilege or power of the covenantee is the convenant primarily 
designed to and does protect; and (2) is the privilege or power in question possessed by 
covenantee by virtue of his estate in land? 
